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Abstract We experiment a new mechanism for the provision of a discrete public good:
in a fixed period individuals can contribute several times; at any moment they can see the
total amount collected; at the end of the period, the public good is provided if the amount
covers the cost. We find that the ability of the mechanism to provide efficiently the public
good decreases with the amount of the provision cost.
Re´sume´ On expe´rimente un nouvel me´canisme de fourniture de bien public discret:
les individus peuvent contribuer a` tout moment durant un intervalle de temps fixe´; a` tout
moment le montant total collecte´ est affiche´ aux individus; a` la fin de l’intervalle de temps,
le bien public est fourni si le montant collecte´ est suffisant pour payer le couˆt. Le principal
resultat des expe´riences est que la capacite´ du me´canisme a` fournir le bien public de manie`re
efficace de´croˆıt avec le niveau du couˆt de production du bien public.
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1 Introduction
The literature of mechanism design on public goods searches ”rules” that implement Pareto-
efficient allocations. Many mechanisms were designed for situations with complete infor-
mation. They produce efficient equilibrium outcomes by using a refinement for the Nash
equilibrium concept. Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) design a very simple mechanism and show
that the undominated perfect equilibria for this mechanism are efficient. Another exemple is
Varian (1994) who uses the subgame perfection as an equilibrium refinement. However, the
assumption of complete information is highly unrealistic. In fact, with complete information
and free communication between individuals, we would expect that the Coase theorem would
work (Coase (1960)).
What we propose here is an experiment of a modified version of the Bagnoli and Lipman
(1989) voluntary contribution game. We drop out the assumption of complete information
about preferences and we change the static environment by introducing the possibility for
players, during a contribution period, to increase at any time their contribution for the
public good. Also, the total amount collected is continuously displayed to individuals. As
in Bagnoli-Lipman’s study there is a discrete public good, individuals have heterogeneous
willingness to pay (WTP) for it, and if the amount collected is less than the provision cost
there is a refund. If the amount exceeds the cost, the extra-contributions are kept by the
collector, contrary to Rondeau et al.(1999) where the extra-contributions are refunded. For
a survey on the experimental study of different public good games, see Ledyard (1995).
We would like to observe the ability of the mechanism to produce efficient provision of
the public good and the sensitivity of this ability depending on the provision cost level.
The fact that players can contribute several times in a period and see the total amount
collected is a kind of communication between them. Players can send messages to other
members of the group and signal their willingness to cooperate, which can make it easier to
coordinate individual actions in comparison to the standard case where players contribute
simultaneously and only once. In an experiment dealing with communication, Chan and
al. (1999) show that communication increases coordination. In another experiment, Cason
and Khan (1999) show that verbal communication is very powerful in increasing voluntary
contribution levels.
Another interesting question is to see how contributions vary in each period, i.e., do
subjects wait for the last seconds to contribute or do they contribute in the beginning of
each period. On the individual level, we can be interested in the way contributions are
related with the WTP, i.e. if people with hign WTP have higher contributions?
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2 Theoretical design
Our design represents the willingness to pay for the public good, denoted pii, as a certain
number of tokens given to each member i = 1, ..., n of a group. The production function is
descrete: players have to contribute an amount that is at least equal to a threshold, c, for
the public good to be realised.
Time in our design is continous as individuals can contribute at any moment and several
times during the period. Denote the individual contribution at time t by α(t), and the
total amount collected for the public good by x(t) ≡ ∑ni=1 ∫ t0 αi(s)ds. The outcome of the
game is defined as the situation that prevails at the end of the contribution period, i. e. at
the terminal date, denoted by T . We take the case where
∑n
i=1 pii > c, which means that
Pareto-efficient outcomes are characterized by x(T ) = c. In other words, the social optimum
for the group is to contribute an amount exactly equal to the threshold c.
It is easely established that Nash equilibrium outcomes are such that x(T ) ≤ c. To see
this, suppose x(T ) > c. Since x(t) is continous and monotone by consrtuction, ∃t¯ < T such
that x(t¯) = c. So, we have at least one i which contributes αi(t) > 0 in t ∈ [t¯, T ]. But in this
case pii −
∫ t¯
0
αi(s)ds > pii −
∫ t¯
0
αi(s)ds−
∫ T
t¯
αi(s)ds which contradicts the fact that αi(t) > 0
for t ∈ [t¯, T ] is a Nash equilibrium strategy.
On the other hand, suppose that at the neighbourhood of the end date, i.e. at T− = T−dt
with dt → 0, we have x(T−) < c. Define the missing amout to provide the public good as
k = c − x(T−). At the limit, we have a one shot simultaneous game and if there is no
individual strategy αi(T ) = k−
∑
j 6=i αj(T ) such that pii ≥
∫ T
0
αi(s)ds, the Nash equilibrium
outcome will be characterized by x(T ) < c.
By cooperating individials can generate a surplus. The difference between c and the sum
of the WTP (
∑
pii − c) is the maximal surplus that the individuals can generate.
We can have two possible benchmarks. The first one supposes that all the members of
the group contribute the same amount to the public good, which gives α = c
n
. We call
this the absolute solution. This solution is compatible with individual rationality only if
min(pi1, ..., pin) ≥ cn . In this case people with high WTP receive a larger part of the surplus.
The second case supposes that the contribution of each player is relative to his (her)
WTP, i.e. if the WTP of a player is two times higher than the WTP of another player, then
his contribution is two times higher. In this case, α˜i =
pii∑
pii
c. Since we suppose
∑
pii > c,
it is always compatible with individual rationality. We call this the relative solution which
implies a more equal surplus sharing.
3
3 Experimental design
We make groups of four persons, n = 4. Two players are endowed in the beginning of each
period with 100 tokens and the two others have 200 tokens, pii = {100, 200}. We run two
treatments. In the first one, the provision point, c, represents 60% of the sum of WTP
(
∑4
i=1 pii = 600) of all players of the group. In the second, it represents 80% of the sum
of WTP, which means that the absolute solution is no longer a plausible outcome1. The
contribution period is fixed to 90 seconds, T = 90 sec.
The experiment was run in January 2004 at the LeeX (Laboratori d’Economia Exper-
imental) at University Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona. Each treatment includes two sessions
of approximatively one hour and a half. In each session we set three independent groups
of four persons, which gives a total number of 24 subjects per treatment. All of them were
students. This gives six independent statistical observations per treatment.
Each group played one practice period, followed by 20 paying periods. At the end of the
period each subject was informed about the number of tokens he had earned. The number
of players constututing the group and the number of periods of the game was common
knowledge. At the end of the session, a questionnnaire was distributed to players.
The experiment was computerised. We used z-Tree as software, developped by Fis-
chbacher (1999). In the beginning of each session subjects were placed randomly to each
computer. Instructions of the experiment were read aloud by the experimenter. We made
sure that they were well understood by all players before starting the game. Communication
were not allowed.
Subjects were paid privately in cash at the end of the experiment. The payment of a
player was composed of the amount of tokens he won plus 6 euros as a show up fee. The
tokens were converted into euros according to the rate: 100 tokens = 1 euro.
4 Results
4.1 Low threshold treatment (c = 360)
Average contribution for all periods and for all groups is 361.98. This corresponds almost
to the threshold and gives us an idea about average behavior. Neverthless, it does not allow
us to know how many times the public good is realised. To do so, we construct an index,
denoted Ieff , that mesures the ability of the mechanism to produce efficient provision of the
public good. It represents the ratio of the number of times a group succeeds in contributing
1We mean an outcome that is compatible with individual rationality.
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Figure 1: Contribution of each group for the 20 experimental peri-
ods in the low treatment.
a sufficient amount for the public good over the total number of playing periods. This index
is computed in Table 1.
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 6 Mean
Ieff 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.50 0.70 0.75 0.68
Table 1: Ratio for the number of times the public good is realised over the total number of playing
periods (low treatment).
Note that Pareto-efficiency require the amount contributed to be exactly the threshold, c.
As shown in Figure 1 and contrary to the theoretical predictions, in many cases contributions
exceed this threshold. We find that this occurs because at the end of the period (last 3
seconds), several members of a group contribute at the same time to complete the missing
amount. However, except for the first five periods – usually considered as learning periods
– the amount of extra-contribution is not large, as it can be seen in Figure 1 (an interesting
extention of our mechanism is to stop contributions once the threshold was reached).
The analysis of the variation of contributions during the 90 seconds of each period may
help us to understand the strategies followed by players. Gradstein (1992) shows that in a
two period model of voluntary contribution with incomplete information, inefficiency occurs
because of a delay in contributions. Although he uses a different production function, it is
interesting to see if in our case, real subjects wait before contributing, as predicted in the
Gradstein’s study.
In Figure 2 we plot the mean contribution during one period for each of the 6 groups,
after 15, 30, 45, 60, 75, and 90sec. This mean is calculated over the 20 observations of the
20 periods.
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Figure 2: Mean contribution and confidence bounds during a pe-
riod.
The results show that on average four groups (1,2, 4 and 6) succeed in reaching 360 at
the end of the period. We can isolate two types of behavior. The first one shows an almost
linear increase for the sum of average contributions. This concerns three groups (2, 3 and 4).
In these groups, players contribute on average constant small amounts several times during
all the period. Two of these groups (2 and 4) succeeded on average in realising the public
good.
The three other groups (1, 5 and 6) behave differently, as their average sum of contri-
butions increase clearly in the first 15 seconds of the period and continue to increase slowly
in the rest of the time. This shows that players in these groups start by signaling their
willingness to cooperate. On average, two of these three groups (groups 1 and 6) succeed in
reaching 360.
There is an end-effect that concerns all the groups, even if it is not very significant, as
contributions increase faster in the last intervall.
On the individual level, we observe that subjects with high WTP contribute more in
absolute terms and less in relative terms (see Table 2). This is because in most of the
cases subjects share the cost of provision equally. For example, in groups 4 and 5 the mean
contribution in absolute terms for individuals with pii = 100 is 84 and 81.4, respectively, and
for individuals with pii = 200 it is 91 and 100.4, respectively. In fact, the absolute solution
(equal cost sharing) implies that each member pays α¯ = 90 tokens, and the relative solution
implies α˜100 = 60 and α˜200 = 120 tokens. The results suggests that individuals implicitly
(without communication) reach an agreement of a nearly equal cost sharing.
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Contribution Absolute Relative (% of pii)
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
pii = 100 71.59 35.61 71.59% 35.61%
pii = 200 108.41 35.98 54.20% 17.99%
Table 2: Mean contribution as function of WTP (low treatment).
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 6 Mean
Ieff 0.05 0.25 0.45 0.25 0.35 0.05 0.23
Table 3: Ratio for the number of times the public good is realised
over the total number of playing periods (high treatment).
4.2 High threshold treatment (c = 480)
In this second treatment, we decrease the surplus available to the group by increasing the
level required for the public good provision. With c = 480, equal cost sharing implies that
each individual pays α¯ = 120, which is more than the initial endowment for individuals
with pii = 100. Intuitively, we expect that the public good must be realised less frequently,
seeing that the set of cost sharing agreements compatible with the individual rationality
of the players is more restricted. In other words, realising the public good requiers more
contribution effort from individuals.
The results confirm our intuition. In fact, the ratio Ieff decreases from an averege value
of 68% in the first treatment to an average of 23% in the second one (see Table 3). Although
the average contribution for all periods and groups is 437.08 in this second treatment, which
is superior to the average contribution in the previous one, it is not enough to realise the
public good. Consequently, the increase of the threshold level increases contributions in
absolute values, but reduces the efficiency of the mechanism. A similar result is found by
Hichri (2004) in another context of a public good game.
The loss in the efficiency of the mechanism can be seen in Figure 3 where the group
contributions are in most of the cases below the threshold of 480 tokens.
The variation of contributions in each group during the 90 seconds of each period is
similar to that of the first treatment, as we still have the two types of behavior.
The analysis of individual contributions shows that, contrarily to the first treatment,
individuals with high WTP contribute much more than those with low WTP in absolute
terms, but still contribute less in relatives terms (see Table 4), which is not sufficient for the
public good to be produced. In fact, the relative solution requires α˜100 = 80 and α˜200 = 160.
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Figure 3: Contribution of each group for the 20 experimental peri-
ods in the high treatment.
Contribution Absolute Relative (% of pii)
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
pii = 100 76.75 46.68 76.75% 46.68%
pii = 200 141.78 45.06 70.89% 22.53%
Table 4: Mean contribution as function of WTP (high treatment).
Thus, the failure to reach the threshold is partially due to individuals with high WTP who
want to keep a larger part of the surplus. Replicating our experiment with the sum of WTP
or the identity of contributors as commun knowledge may incite them to contribute more.
Future research can consider this possibility.
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Appendix
These instructions are a translation from Spanish of the instructions that were distributed
to subjects before the beginning of the experiment. They contain also a translation of
the questionary that was distributed to them after the end of the game. The instructions
presented here correspond to one of the two treatments tested (Low threshold treatment).
Those relative to High threshold treatment were changed to reflect the difference with the
first treatment concerning thelevel of the provision point.
Instructions to the Experiment
Welcome,
You will participate to an experiment that will allow you to earn money. The
amount you will win will be given to you at the end of the experiment. Indepen-
dently of the game, you have already 6 euro that will be added to your earned
money at the end of the experiment.
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As shown in the following illustration of the game, the groups in the experiment
will be randomly formed with four persons per group (you and three other per-
sons). The identity of the three persons of your group will not be revealed to
you.
Each group will be composed of the same persons during all the experiment. The
latter is formed of one practice period that will not be considered when computing
your gains, and 20 remunerated periods. The session will last approximatively
one hour and a half. groups are independant and do not interact with each other.
You are not allowed to communicate with any person in the room during all the
session. If you have any question at any moment, please rase your hand and the
experimenter will answer privately your questions. Any communication will lead
to your exclusion from the room without any payment.
In each period, you have to take a decision and your payoff will depend on this
decision and on those of the other members of your group. Your total gain of the
hole session will be the sum of your gains from the 20 periods. The aim of the
experiment is to win the maximum of points.
In the beginning of each period, you will see on the comuter screen the number
of points you have. This number is a private information and can be different
from the number assigned to the other members of your group. You will have
the same number in all the periods of the game (20 periods).
In each period, during one minute and 30 seconds, you can put at any mement
and several times a part of the points you have in a urn. The total number of
points you put in the urn and the sum of points that all the group put in this
urn will be indicated continuously on the computer screen.
At the end of the period, if the sum of the points that all the members of the
group put in this urn is superior or equal to 360, each one wins the rest of points
he still has. In the case where the number 360 is not reached, each one wins
nothing and loose all the points he put in the urn and all the points he still has.
Example:
*Suppose that you have 150 points and that you put 100 points in the urn. If
the sum of the points that your group put in the urn is 300 (< 360), each person
of your group wins zero.
*Suppose that you have 150 points and that you put 100 in the urn. If the sum
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of the points that your group put in the urn is 400 (≥ 360), you win 150 - 100 =
50 points
At the end of each period, the points you win during this period will be indicared
on the computer screen.
This game will be repeated identiqually during all the periods of the game.
At the end of the experiment, you will be paid in cash and pravately. The
total number of points you will win in the 20 periods of the experiment will be
converted into euro at the rate of:
1 euro = 100 points
Illustration of the game distributed to subjects
In Figure 4 we present the schema of the game distributed to subjects.
Questionnaire distributed to subjects
Number of your computer:
Studies:
Level of Studies:
Gender:
1. Have you participated to experimental sessions before?
2. Have you understood the game and the instructions?
3. According to you, what was the aim of the experiment?
4. have you really tried to win?
5. What was you strategy?
6.What determinated your choices concerning the number of points you have
put in the urn?
Screenshot
In Figure 5 we print the screen that individuals had seen during the experiment on theirs
computers:
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Figure 4: Illustration of the game.
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Figure 5: Screenshot (Software z-Tree).
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